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Abstract: This essay proposes a new interpretation of a central, and yet over-
looked, argument Leibniz offers against Descartes’s power-free ontology of the 
corporeal world. Appealing to considerations about the successiveness of motion, 
Leibniz attempts to show that the reality of motion requires force. It is often 
assumed that the argument is driven by concerns inspired by Zeno. Against such 
a reading, this essay contends that Leibniz’s argument is instead best understood 
against the background of an Aristotelian view of the priority of real being over 
time. The essay also shows how this alternative interpretation can help to shed 
new light on the difference between Leibnizian forces and Aristotelian powers, as 
well as on Leibniz’s famous claim that accounting for force leads us beyond the 
mechanistic corporeal realm.
1  Introduction
Leibniz was critical of the Cartesian view that extension constitutes the essence 
of body and that all the variety in the corporeal world is to be accounted for in 
terms of the fundamental modes of extension: size, shape, and motion. A main 
problem, he famously argues, is that such a view leaves out force or power.
I will discuss one of the key issues concerning Leibniz’s critique: his engage-
ment with the Cartesian conception of motion. In the Principles of Philosophy 
Descartes characterizes motion in the “proper sense” as “the translation of one 
piece of matter, or one body, from the vicinity of the other bodies which are in 
immediate contact with it, and which are regarded as being at rest, to the vicinity 
of other bodies.” (AT VIIIA 53/CSM I 233) Leibniz takes this passage to express 
a purely geometrical conception of motion: there is nothing more to a body’s 
being in motion than transfer or translation, i.  e., its successively occupying dif-
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ferent positions.1 “In order to say that something is moving,” Leibniz objects, it 
is required that “there be within itself a cause of change, a force, an action” (GP 
IV 369/L 393).
This line of criticism is likely to appear peculiar to a modern reader. One pecu-
liarity has to do with the kind of forces Leibniz takes to be central. After Newton, 
the claim that forces play a fundamental role in nature is obviously uncontro-
versial. More surprising, however, is Leibniz’s idea that the relevant forces are, 
as he explains in the passage just quoted, forces internal to bodies, sustaining 
their motions. We tend to think of such forces or powers  – Leibniz often uses 
these terms interchangeably2 – as belonging to an Aristotelian conception of the 
natural world displaced by the mechanistic science championed by both Des-
cartes and Leibniz. According to the mechanistic view, the basic form of motion is 
inertial: a body keeps on moving at the same rate along a straight line until some-
thing gets in its way. This is usually taken to imply that no forces are needed to 
maintain a body’s motion, but only to change it.3 It is not so far-fetched then to see 
the mechanistic view as inviting just the sort of conception of motion Descartes 
offers, a conception of motion as fundamentally power-free – as mere translation.
Another aspect of Leibniz’s criticism that might at first sight strike us as 
peculiar is the central role he gives to considerations about reality or real being. 
If motion consists in mere translation, then, he claims, “there will be no real 
motion” (GP IV 369/L 393) or “nothing real in motion” (GM VI 235/AG 118). That is, 
in criticizing the Cartesian conception of motion Leibniz’s primary point is that 
force is needed as a real ground of motion.
1 Descartes’s position has been subject to much scholarly discussion, and I certainly do not 
mean to take a stand on this vexed matter. As my aim is to explicate Leibniz’s view, it is enough 
for my purposes to present Descartes as Leibniz understands him. For an interpretation of Des-
cartes that comes close to Leibniz’s reading see, e.  g., Garber 1992, 293–9. Other commentators 
such as Woolhouse 1993, 86–88, 121  f., and Hoffman 2009 attribute to Descartes a view of the role 
of force in motion more in line with the one defended by Leibniz. In any case, it seems fair to say 
that Descartes himself is much less concerned with the issue than Leibniz is.
2 For the interchangeability of vis (French: force) and potentia or virtus (French: puissance) see, 
e.  g., GM VI 236/AG 119; GP IV 509/AG 160; NE 169. Note that Leibniz distinguishes the forces 
associated with motion (active forces) from those associated with resistance and impenetrability 
(passive forces) (e.  g., GM VI 236/AG 119; GP IV 511/AG 162; A II.iii 547/LDV 75). I will use the term 
‘force’ to denote active force, in line with Leibniz’s claim that active force is what “one usually 
calls ‘force’ in the absolute sense” (GP IV 395/AG 252).
3 While the principle of inertia was not fully formulated before Newton, it is widely accepted 
that something like this principle is expressed already in Descartes’s first law of nature. Newton 
himself had a rather complex view of the role of force in uniform motion, see McMullin 1978, 
33–43.
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To understand what the worry about the reality of motion amounts to, and 
how it is supposed to license what looks like a return to an Aristotelian view, 
I will focus on what I take to be Leibniz’s main line of argument against the 
Cartesian picture, namely that as mere translation motion will be something 
merely successive. In the literature this argument – which I will call the argu-
ment from successiveness – has been treated rather cursorily. More attention has 
been given to another argument to the same conclusion offered by Leibniz: an 
argument from the relativity of motion, i.  e., from the fact that translation takes 
place, as Descartes puts it in the passage just quoted, “from the vicinity of the 
other bodies which are in immediate contact with it, and which are regarded as 
being at rest, to the vicinity of other bodies.” Leibniz argues that without force 
or power such relativity will undermine the very distinction between motion and 
rest. This argument, which is the one that Leibniz stresses in his remarks on 
Descartes’s Principles, raises interesting questions concerning the notion of re la-
tivity.4 Yet for the purposes of understanding the heart of Leibniz’s opposition 
to the Cartesian view the argument from relativity seems secondary: what the 
argument from successiveness aims to show is that the conception of motion as 
mere translation is problematic in itself, independently of further considerations 
about relativity.
Given its significance, the neglect of the argument from successiveness is 
unfortunate. One reason why it has not received much attention may be that the 
argument has often been read as simply trading on ideas about the composition 
of motion already familiar from Zeno. I will argue, however, that such a reading 
leads astray and thereby also obscures the interest of the argument. As I will 
explain in more detail below, the argument is better understood as driven by a 
broadly Aristotelian view of the priority of real being over time, a view funda-
mentally at odds with the Zenonian motivations commonly ascribed to Leibniz. 
Connectedly, I will suggest that the role of power in grounding motion has to do 
precisely with the way in which powers are supposed to be prior to the temporal 
order. This approach will allow us to see that the forces constituting the reality 
of motion are not to be construed as instantaneous tendencies to change posi-
tion, as interpreters have been prone to assume. Instead, I show that the relevant 
notion of force is that of enduring activity, wholly present throughout motion, on 
the model of an Aristotelian energeia.
Against the background of the conception of force emerging from a close 
examination of the argument from successiveness, we will also be able to revisit 
4 On the argument from relativity see, e.  g., Puryear 2012 and Arthur 2015, and further references 
given therein.
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two of Leibniz’s most central, but difficult, claims about the nature of force. 
To begin with, the idea of force as enduring activity can help us to appreciate the 
contrast he draws between his own notion of power as force and the Aristotelian 
notion of power as potency. In addition, attending to the priority of force over 
time offers a promising new starting-point for explaining Leibniz’s well-known 
thesis that force needs to be located beyond the mechanistic corporeal realm.
I will proceed as follows. In Section 2, I present the argument from succes-
siveness, as well as a common way of reading it. In Section 3, I turn to some 
problems with this reading, arising from Leibniz’s commitment to a broadly Aris-
totelian view of time. Drawing on the latter, and the associated conception of the 
nature and role of power in constituting change, in Section 4 I propose a novel 
interpretation of the argument from successiveness, which also better allows 
us to appreciate its modal strength. In the final section, I explore some main 
ramifications of this interpretation: the way it bears on the difference between 
Leibniz’s notion of force and the Aristotelian notion of power, as well as on the 
problem of locating Leibnizian forces within the mechanistic view of the corpo-
real world.
2  The Argument from Successiveness
Leibniz discusses the argument from successiveness in published works as 
well as letters throughout his career. I will begin by examining one of his most 
succinct, as well as oft-cited, formulations of the argument, found in the first 
paragraph of his seminal 1695 essay “Specimen dynamicum,” where he tries to 
anticipate a Cartesian worry about his thesis that force is fundamental to the cor-
poreal world.5 The worry is that bringing in forces would conflict with the central 
mechanistic tenet “that every corporeal action derives from motion, and that 
motion itself comes only from motion, either previously existing in the body or 
impressed from without.” (GM VI 235/AG 118) In other words, the tenet says that 
in order to explain why a body moves we only need to appeal to motion: either 
the body’s own previous motion, or that of another body by virtue of which the 
first one is set into motion. Here ‘motion’ of course means local motion, change 
of position, as this is what all corporeal change consists in on the mechanistic 
world-picture.
5 Other examples include A II.ii, 171, 434, 488, 590, 748, 864; A II.iii, 101, 336, 452  f.; Costabel 
1973, 106; LDV 382n4; GP III 457/WF 201; D II.2 154. I will focus on texts from the late 1680s to the 
early 1700s, the period in which Leibniz makes most use of the argument.
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Leibniz’s response to the worry is to use the argument from successiveness 
to show that the mechanistic tenet in fact presupposes the notion of force. It is 
actually the Cartesian view – the view that leaves out force, conceiving of motion 
as mere translation – that conflicts with the mechanistic view:
For, strictly speaking [si rem ad akribeian revoces], motion (and likewise time), never exists, 
since the whole never exists, inasmuch as it does not have coexistent parts. And so, there 
is nothing real in motion but a momentary something which must consist in a force striv-
ing toward change. [Nihilque adeo in ipso reale est, quam momentaneum illud quod in vi ad 
mutationem niente constitui debet.] (GM VI 235/AG 118)6
By characterizing motion as having parts that do not coexist (successive parts) 
Leibniz seems to mean that motion consists in a body’s being at one time in one 
location, and at another time in a different location.7 He wants to argue that 
this cannot be an exhaustive account of motion, since such an account needs 
to involve force. Given the schematic character of the passage, it is perhaps less 
clear what exactly his line of argument is supposed to be. Before delving into the 
details, it is worth highlighting what is distinctive about Leibniz’s concerns, in 
particular since the conception of motion to which he objects, the conception 
of motion as mere translation, may, as noted earlier, seem like a natural conse-
quence of the mechanistic world-picture.
Typically, the reason the mechanistic view is taken to undercut the Aristo-
telian doctrine of powers keeping bodies in motion is that the latter is bound 
up with the idea that we need to appeal to a mover (agent), as well as a moved 
(patient), to explain not only why a process of change is instigated, but why it con-
tinues. Yet on the mechanistic view the basic form of motion is uniform motion, 
which continues without the need for any mover. And from that perspective, it 
may then seem natural to question the need for powers, along the lines of Des-
cartes and other early modern thinkers.8
It is, however, important to note that the question of why motion takes place 
is not really Leibniz’s primary interest in the passage from the “Specimen” just 
quoted. The problem with taking mere translation from one position to another 
as an exhaustive account of motion is not that it fails to explain why a body con-
6 Here and in some subsequent quotes I have slightly modified the translation cited in order to 
stay closer to Leibniz’s original phrasing.
7 Leibniz speaks of motion as a “successive being” (e.  g., A II.ii 170  f., 434) and sometimes also of 
“the transitory nature of motion” (LDV 339).
8 Koyré 1965, 66–72, attributes such a line of thought to Descartes. As Hoffman 2009, 126, notes, 
it is not clear that in itself this is enough to rule out the need for force to explain why motion 
continues.
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tinues in motion, but that it fails to explain what motion is. That is, the argument 
from successiveness is concerned with the nature of motion.
To begin to understand the problem about the nature of motion that Leibniz 
wants to raise, it is useful to first try to unpack some of the terminology he 
employs in the passage (henceforth I will simply refer to it as ‘the “Specimen” 
passage’). Note, in the first place, that the question of whether motion “exists” 
is a question about the reality of motion, as for example comes out in another 
formulation of the argument: “Since in itself motion never has its parts together, 
no more than time does, it cannot pass for a real being [quelque estre reel]” (A 
II.ii 590; cf. A II.ii 171, 434). Real being here contrasts with what Leibniz calls 
phenomenon. This is a distinction between mind-independent and mind-de-
pendent, respectively. Yet it is important not to confuse the distinction between 
real being and phenomenon with our modern distinction between objective and 
subjective: the former concerns the ontological status of entities, whereas the 
latter concerns truth. In the time period, Leibniz’s distinction would have been 
more commonplace. Traditionally, relations, such as being-taller-than, were 
taken to be a paradigmatic example of something mind-dependent (a so-called 
being of reason) – not because Plato’s being taller than Socrates would be sub-
jective, but because being-taller-than is not in itself an ingredient of reality. 
What is real are Plato and Socrates with their respective statures, serving as 
the foundation for the comparison on which the relation of being-taller-than 
depends.9
Leibniz’s talk of “real in motion” then means that motion is a phenomenon: it 
does not itself belong to basic reality, but is grounded in, or contains, something 
real. It is in in this sense that I will also use the expressions ‘reality of’ or ‘reality 
in’. It is important to note that without such a basis in reality a phenomenon 
would, as Leibniz puts it to Arnauld, be something “wholly imaginary” (A II.ii 
186/LA 122), something “where there is nothing real” (A II.ii 169).10
9 On the traditional notion of being of reason (ens rationis), see Doyle 1995 and Carriero 2015. 
Leibniz himself uses the term ‘being of reason’ but often seems to reserve it for that which 
depends on the intellect whereas the distinctive mark of phenomena is that they depend on 
perception or imagination (A II.ii 185/LA 121; GP VI 586/AG 263). In the context of the argument 
from successiveness, Leibniz usually employs the term ‘phenomenon’.
10 Leibniz sometimes uses the expression “real motion” (e.  g., GP IV 369/L 393). This does not 
mean that motion is something real tout court – as interpreters sometimes assume – but rather 
that motion is a phenomenon based in reality. Here I agree with Puryear 2012. My account, how-
ever, differs somewhat from his: for example, he reads the qualification “in itself” as introducing 
a specification of the essence of motion (Puryear 2012, 153), whereas I believe it signals that what 
is considered is an abstraction (see below).
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The second piece of terminology concerns the qualifications “strictly speak-
ing” and “in itself,” which Leibniz also employs synonymously with “formally 
and precisely” (e.  g., A II.ii 171; A VI.iv 1559/AG 51). We should not read these qual-
ifications as signaling an account of the nature of motion: Leibniz uses ‘formally’ 
(formaliter or formellement) in the sense of a distinction of reason, something 
mind-dependent, along the lines of singling out an aspect in thought.11 Note 
further that for Leibniz ‘precisely’ seems more or less interchangeable with ‘sepa-
rated from’ or ‘in abstraction from’ (A II.ii 274/LA 167; A II.ii 81/LA 65; A II.ii 191). 
This is in line with the traditional meaning of praecise as cutting away (prescind-
ing) from: to consider something precisely is to consider it apart from, excluding, 
something else.12 Read in this way “strictly speaking” (“in itself”) simply indi-
cates that we are here concerned with an aspect taken in isolation: a body consid-
ered only insofar as it changes position.
The general point of the “Specimen” passage appears then to be the fol-
lowing: by supposing that motion taken strictly offers an exhaustive account of 
the nature of motion, the Cartesian view leaves out what is real in motion, thus 
making motion into something “wholly imaginary” – into something that cannot 
(contrary to what the Cartesians assume) be a fundamental mode at all. This is 
Leibniz’s reason for claiming that it is the Cartesian position, and not his own, 
that conflicts with the mechanistic tenet about the causal role of motion: in order 
to make sense of that role, motion needs to be based in something real.
Now that we have a better understanding of what Leibniz wants to claim, we 
can turn to his motivations for these claims. Why is motion as something succes-
sive a phenomenon? Why does an account of motion as mere translation under-
mine the reality of motion? And why does the reality of motion require force?
Given Leibniz’s emphasis on motion having parts, it may be thought that 
a natural place to look for an answer to these questions is his well-known doc-
trine that aggregates are phenomena in that their unity is dependent on their 
being conceived of as unities.13 On this line of interpretation (call it the aggregate 
reading), motion is a phenomenon because it is an aggregate, although the parts 
are successive, and not coexistent, as in the case of, say, a heap of sand. Yet this 
is not quite what Leibniz says. The reason motion never exists is not that it has 
parts, which happen to be successive, but it has specifically to do with the succes-
siveness of the parts. Moreover, even if considerations about aggregation could 
11 See, e.  g., LDV 257 and LDB 309. This is a use we also find in Descartes (e.  g., AT IV 439/CSMK 
280).
12 For a useful discussion of the scholastic Aristotelian notion of praecise, see Carriero 2009, 
94  f.
13 See, e.  g., A II.ii 120/LA 93  f. For a helpful treatment, see Lodge 2001.
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explain the phenomenality of motion, it is hard to see how this could account for 
the stronger claim that motion considered as mere translation is a phenomenon 
without any basis in reality. For when Leibniz says that there is “nothing real” 
in motion thus construed, this presumably implies that even the parts of motion 
turn out to lack reality. And if the aggregate reading does not offer any expla-
nation of the latter claim, it also leaves us without any explanation of Leibniz’s 
inference to the need for force as what is real in motion.
Another approach to the argument from successiveness may seem more 
promising. The approach goes back to Bertrand Russell’s proposal that the “Spe-
ci men” passage simply offers a version of “the old argument of Zeno”: “Motion 
is change of position; but at any one instant the position is one and only one. 
Hence at every instant, and therefore always, there is no change of position and 
no motion.” (Russell 1937, 88)14 While such a “Zenonian” reading shares with the 
aggregate reading the assumption that motion is built up from parts, this is not 
seen as the source of the problem with conceiving motion as mere translation. 
Instead, the problem is located in the fact that the parts of motion contain no 
motion: at any moment of its trajectory a body simply occupies a given position. 
In this way, the Zenonian reading can make sense of the crucial claim that motion 
construed as mere translation is a phenomenon lacking any basis in reality. If the 
parts of a body’s motion consist in the body’s occupying different locations at 
different times, there is no intrinsic difference at a moment between motion and 
rest. And in that case, a conception of motion as mere translation would leave 
motion without any reality at all, in line with Zeno’s original conclusion.
In order to avoid that conclusion, it seems as if there has to be some feature 
of the parts of motion that can serve to ground its reality. This is what, on the 
Zenonian reading, explains Leibniz’s inference to the need for force. His charac-
terizations of force as “a momentary something” and as “striving toward change” 
(GM VI 235/AG 118) have suggested to interpreters that force in this context is to 
be understood as an instantaneous (existing at, and only at, an instant) tendency 
to change position. Such a view would, as Donald Rutherford proposes, be akin 
to the way in which some philosophers have recently construed the notion of 
14 Cf. Wilson 1989, 204  f. Sometimes the Zenonian reading seems to be simply assumed, see, 
e.  g., Rutherford 2008 discussed below. It is worth noticing that Phemister has suggested what 
seems to be yet another reading of the argument from successiveness, claiming that the problem 
is that “motion is unreal due to the body’s lack of co-existent parts. No aggregate of parts remains 
the same long enough to be able to count as the subject of the motion.” (Phemister 2005, 191) It is 
not clear to me why Phemister talks about body here, since Leibniz explicitly says that it is motion 
that lacks co-existent parts. It is true that for Leibniz bodies do not persist through change. Yet 
this is not because they would lack co-existent parts, but because they lack true unity.
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instantaneous velocity within classical mechanics as a tendency at an instant t0 
to bring about change of position at a certain rate after t0.15 Thus conceived, force 
seems to supply exactly the kind of feature needed for the parts of motion to serve 
as a ground of motion: instantaneous tendencies make for a distinction between 
motion and rest at a moment, and so can supply the “real elements” of motion. 
On the Zenonian reading, what is real in motion is a succession of instantaneous 
tendencies.
While the Zenonian reading at first sight appears as a rather straightforward 
way of construing the argument from successiveness, it fails to account for the 
modal strength of Leibniz’s conclusion: it only gets us to the idea of force as a 
candidate for avoiding the Zenonian predicament, but does not explain why what 
is real in motion “must consist in a force” (emphasis added). As we will see next, 
the reading also faces deeper problems, since it seems hard to reconcile with 
some of Leibniz’s other doctrines. Before turning to these problems, and to the 
alternative interpretation I propose, it is worth considering briefly the broader 
significance of getting the argument from successiveness right.
The conception of force the Zenonian reading attributes to Leibniz  – the 
conception of force as instantaneous tendency to change position  – reflects a 
widespread picture of his general view of the nature of corporeal, or what he 
also terms derivative, force.16 This picture tends in turn to shape discussions of 
the relationship of the corporeal world to the basic metaphysical order of sub-
stances in Leibniz. He famously holds that the nature of substance, or what he 
in later writings terms monad, lies beyond the corporeal realm and is constituted 
by primitive force, which he characterizes in terms of the notions of soul, percep-
tion, and appetite. This is commonly taken to imply that the model of a substance 
for Leibniz is a Cartesian mind. His system thus appears to contain two funda-
mentally distinct types of force: the derivative forces at the corporeal level are 
15 Rutherford 2008, 277, citing Lange 2005 (on which I also draw here) as an example of this 
approach to instantaneous velocity.
16 For the distinction between derivative and primitive forces see, e.  g., GM VI 237/AG 119. Note 
that I am simplifying matters in two ways. To begin with, corporeal forces also include passive 
forces, but since my focus, as already noted, is on active force, I leave passive forces aside (see 
footnote 2 above). Secondly, while Leibniz himself often reserves the term ‘derivative force’ for 
corporeal forces, the notion of derivative force is commonly taken to apply also to the perceptual 
and appetitive modifications of substances. My reason for limiting my use of ‘derivative force’ to 
corporeal forces is simply that I am concerned with outlining a common worry about the rela-
tionship between corporeal derivative forces and the primitive forces of substances. And in any 
case, it is not obvious to me, as will become clearer later on, that the correct way of framing the 
relationship between corporeal and substantial forces is in terms of a relationship between types 
of force.
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instantaneous tendencies to change position, whereas the primitive forces at the 
fundamental level of reality are mind-like in nature.
This leads to a much-debated problem: it is difficult to see how these types 
of force are related to each other, especially since Leibniz claims that derivative 
forces are modifications of primitive forces – for how could tendencies to change 
position be modifications of something like a Cartesian mind? What makes the 
problem even more pressing is that, according to Leibniz, the reason why the 
ultimate level of reality needs to lie beyond the corporeal realm has to do with 
the very notion of force itself. In the “New System,” published the same year as 
the “Specimen,” he explains that from force “there follows something analogous 
to sensation and appetite,” which is why we must conceive of the nature of sub-
stance “on the model of the notion we have of souls” (GP IV 479/AG 139). This is 
often read as suggesting that mind-likeness is built into the very notion of force. 
But in that case, it is natural to wonder not only how derivative forces can be mod-
ifications of primitive forces, but how derivative forces could in any way count as 
genuine forces.17
While my primary concern here is with the argument from successiveness, I 
believe that my alternative reading of the argument also has important implica-
tions for these broader issues. Towards the end of the essay, I will indicate how 
reconsidering the argument from successiveness can help rethinking the tradi-
tional way of framing the relationship between derivative and primitive, or corpo-
real and substantial, forces.
3  Time, Change, and Power
In order to see why the Zenonian reading is problematic, we need to attend more 
closely to Leibniz’s emphasis on the relationship between motion and time in 
the “Specimen” passage: “if we are speaking strictly, motion (and likewise time), 
never exists, since the whole never exists, inasmuch as it does not have coexist-
ent parts.” (GM VI 235/AG 118, emphasis added). In a draft of a letter to Arnauld, 
Leibniz elaborates on that relationship as follows:
17 This way of setting up the issue seems to constitute a common ground for many interpre-
tations of Leibniz, despite disagreement over how to spell out the ontological status of deriva-
tive forces and their relationship to primitive forces. Prominent examples of a so-called idealist 
approach to corporeal forces include Adams 1994, 378–93; Rutherford 1995, 237–88; Rutherford 
2008. Phemister 2005, 187–211, defends a more realist view, whereas Garber 2009, 99–179, 303–
88, takes the problems just indicated to express a deep conflict within Leibniz’s philosophy.
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[W]hen it comes to motion, it is very clear that, as it is a successive being and does not have 
its parts together, it could never exist, no more than the time which it needs […] formally 
and precisely motion consists in a change of neighborhood continued for some time (A II.ii 
170  f.).
The claim that time does not exist reflects Leibniz’s well-known view that time 
is mind-dependent, or as he will later put it, ideal.18 At first sight, this point 
may seem to be in line with the Zenonian reading: the idea that motion, some-
thing that requires an interval of time, needs to be composed of instantaneous 
parts, seems to rely precisely on a commitment to the unreality of the temporal 
interval.
Yet, on closer inspection, the Zenonian view actually turns out to be very 
much at odds with Leibniz’s position. By claiming that time is ideal, he does 
not mean to say that time is built up from instants. Instead, Leibniz is in general 
agreement with Aristotle’s familiar criticism of Zeno in book VI of the Physics. 
Given that time is a continuous quantity, Aristotle argues, the interval is prior to 
the instant, as a line is prior to points: just as points are termini of line segments, 
instants are termini of intervals. Echoing Aristotle’s view, Leibniz explains in the 
New Essays that “strictly speaking, points and instants are not parts of time or 
space, and do not have parts either. They are only termini.” (NE 152)
Combining the rejection of the Zenonian position with the thesis that time 
is mind-dependent would not have been surprising from an Aristotelian per-
spective. While endorsing Aristotle’s view of the priority of the interval over the 
instant, scholastic Aristotelians commonly took time to be a being of reason.19 
This is reflected in the widespread skepticism among these thinkers towards 
counting so-called successive entities (entia successiva), entities that have differ-
ent parts at different times, as real.20 A process of change, such as the growth 
of a plant, was taken to be a paradigmatic instance of a successive entity: for 
the process to exist would be for some stretch of it, some temporally successive 
stages, to exist.
Leibniz’s view is thus in line with a broadly Aristotelian conception of the 
priority of reality over time, a conception comprising both the claim that the 
18 I set aside the details of Leibniz’s complex views of time and space. For somewhat differing 
interpretations see, e.  g., Hartz/Cover 1988 and Arthur 2014, 142–65.
19 This was how they understood Aristotle’s characterization of time as the measure of change. 
For an overview of the discussion within mediaeval Aristotelianism, see Trifogli 2010, 272–5.
20 Here I am indebted to the discussion of mediaeval treatments of entia successiva in Pasnau 
2011, 374–89. He also notes in passing that Leibniz seems to endorse the Aristotelian conception 
of successive entities (Pasnau 2011, 374).
12   Peter Myrdal
temporal interval is prior to instants and the claim that time itself is a being of 
reason. On the face of it, it is then difficult to see how he could have thought of the 
problem faced by the Cartesian conception of motion in Zenonian terms, i.  e., as 
a problem about how to compose motion out of instants. It is equally difficult to 
see how the “solution” the Zenonian reading attributes to Leibniz – that the real 
elements of motion are instantaneous tendencies – could make sense for him. If 
instants depend on time, and time itself is unreal, instants can hardly count as 
real. Indeed, what the Zenonian reading takes to be the real elements of change 
would for Leibniz be two steps removed from reality: since instants depend on 
time, and time is a being of reason, what is instantaneous depends on something 
that is itself mind-dependent.21
As a point of contrast, it is instructive to consider the positive account of the 
reality of change found in the Aristotelian tradition. In characterizing successive 
entities, such as a process of change, as beings of reason, Aristotelians imply that 
while these are not in themselves real, they nevertheless have a foundation in 
reality. Aristotelians also hold that this foundation is to be understood in terms 
of power – in other words, for Aristotelians powers are not only, or perhaps even 
primarily, supposed to enter into the explanation of why change occurs, but also 
serve to ground the reality of change. Yet it would have been foreign to Aristo-
telians, for the reasons already given, to think of powers as instantaneous ten-
dencies, in the vein of the Zenonian reading. When Aristotelians characterize a 
process of change as having successive parts, they do not want to say that the 
reality of the process is to be found in its parts.
The profound difference between, on the one hand, the Aristotelian concep-
tion of the nature of power and its role in relation to change, and, on the other 
hand, the one the Zenonian reading attributes to Leibniz, comes out in Aristot-
le’s famous characterization of change (kinesis) in the Physics as “the actuality of 
what is in potency, as such” (201a9). Early modern philosophers often ridiculed 
Aristotle’s formulation as obscure, but his general point is not particularly dif-
ficult to discern. What he is concerned with is precisely the role of the notion 
21 In an earlier writing, Leibniz even contends that “what exists only at a moment has no exist-
ence, since it starts and finishes at the same time” (A VI.iv 296/LOC 297). For a helpful discus-
sion of this text and Leibniz’s earlier views on motion, see Levey 2010. Cf. also the criticism 
in  Whipple 2010 and Crockett 2005 of a common tendency among commentators to attribute a 
notion of instantaneous state to Leibniz. While I am sympathetic to their criticisms, my claim 
here does not depend on taking a stand on the general issue of the status of instantaneous states 
in Leibniz. In raising doubts about the Zenonian reading, my aim is simply to pave the way for a 
positive alternative proposal about how to interpret Leibniz’s argument.
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of potency or power22 as answering the question of the nature of change (rather 
than that of why change occurs). To put it briefly, his claim is that a process of 
change consists in a potency insofar as it is actual, but not fully actual – ‘as such’ 
signals that the power is still in potency – the full actuality being the end-point of 
change. For example, an oak’s augmentative power is aimed at its full size, and 
when that size is reached the process of growth has come to an end; the process 
consists not in the full actuality of the power, but in the power’s being progres-
sively actualized.23 This is not to say, at least for scholastic Aristotelians, that the 
actualization of power would constitute the process as a further ingredient in the 
world. Rather, the idea is that the power somehow functions as the real basis on 
which the process, as a being of reason, depends.
What is distinctive about the conception of the role and nature of power 
offered in the Physics passage is that a power is present throughout change: the 
augmentative power of a plant underlies the entire process of its growth. Rather 
than being an instantaneous tendency, a power is, as scholastic Aristotelians put 
it, permanent, not in the sense that it could not cease to exist, but in the sense 
that it is something enduring.24 The significance of permanence in this context 
can readily be understood in light of the Aristotelian thesis of reality as prior to 
time. Given that powers are permanent, time does not enter into their essence: it 
is not part of what it is to be a power to have some temporal duration or to exist at 
some particular time, but powers are fully present at any moment of their exist-
ence. Powers also provide a basis for an ordering that does not inherently depend 
on temporal indexing. Sprouting, developing roots, and growing foliage and 
stalks are to be understood as degrees of actualization of a plant’s augmentative 
power. The priority of, e.  g., growing roots over foliage and stalks is not based on 
a difference in time, but on the fact that the latter degree of actuality is attained 
22 For now, I will use the terms ‘power’ and ‘potency’ interchangeably, although Leibniz, as we 
will see in Section 5 below, wants to distinguish his own notion of power as force from the Aris-
totelian notion of power as potency.
23 See Coope 2009. On subsequent scholastic developments of this idea, see Maier 1982, 21–39, 
and Trifogli 2010.
24 This is compatible with the fact that some mediaeval Aristotelians connected permanence to 
the possibility of momentary existence (Pasnau 2011, 378). Here I think it is helpful to distinguish 
between: (i) S possibly existing only at an instant; and (ii) S being instantaneous in the sense of 
essentially existing only at an instant. In (ii) momentary existence is built into the essence of S, 
whereas in (i) it is because the essence of S is non-temporal (it is neither of the essence of S to 
exist at, nor for, some time) that it is possible for S to exist only at an instant. The possibility of 
momentary existence does not, however, necessarily follow from a non-temporal essence. For 
example, it is not clear that such a possibility would have made sense for Leibniz, see footnote 
21 above.
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via the former. It is in this sense that powers and their actualizations can be said 
to be prior to the temporal order.
However the details of the Aristotelian view are supposed to be worked out, 
we are already in a position to see that there are good reasons to question the 
Zenonian reading of Leibniz’s argument from successiveness, as such a reading 
appears to conflict with his view of time. At a more general level, the dialecti-
cal setting of the argument also makes Zenonian considerations appear out of 
place. Given that Leibniz seems to want to defend the Aristotelian idea of motion 
as sustained by power against Descartes, it would be rather strange for him to 
appeal to considerations that from an Aristotelian perspective are incoherent. Yet 
my aim in contrasting the Zenonian reading to the Aristotelian position is not 
mainly negative. I believe that taking into account the Aristotelian conception of 
the relationship between change, reality, and power also offers an alternative way 
of construing Leibniz’s argument.
4  The Argument from Successiveness 
Reconsidered
In this section, I aim to show that reading Leibniz’s criticism of the Cartesian view 
as expressing an Aristotelian, rather than a Zenonian, concern with successive-
ness makes better sense of the structure of the argument, its modal strength, as 
well as the notion of power or force it involves.
The first point to keep in mind is that the traditional Aristotelian worry about 
successiveness takes a distinctive shape in light of the Cartesian conception of 
the corporeal world. For Aristotelians, the question of the status of processes 
of change is a question of whether the process is something that exists in addi-
tion to the power’s being actualized. What is conceived in conceiving a process 
of change, a successive entity, is a power actualized to different degrees. Now, 
when Descartes gets rid of powers, construing motion as mere translation, all that 
seems to be left is a body’s occupying different locations at different times. That 
is, all that is conceived in conceiving the motion of a body B is something like 
B-at-l1-at-t1, B-at-l2-at-t2, and so on. From Leibniz’s perspective, the latter are not, 
however, good candidates for something real, given that time is ideal. Not only 
then is motion considered strictly a phenomenon, given that it is a successive 
entity, but if mere translation is all there is to motion, then there is a very deep 
sense in which there is nothing real in motion. In this way, taking into account 
the dependence of motion on time is enough to explain Leibniz’s claim that the 
Cartesian view deprives motion of any ground in reality. There is no need, as there 
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is on the Zenonian reading, to introduce a further appeal to the lack of an intrinsic 
difference at a moment between motion and rest.
One may of course wonder whether considerations about the priority of 
reality over time would have been compelling to Leibniz’s Cartesian opponent. 
From a contemporary point-of-view, such considerations may seem foreign: 
nowadays philosophers – whatever their exact conception of the nature of time – 
tend to think of time (or space-time) as a prior order in which things exist and 
changes take place. Yet it is important to note that the view of time as mind-de-
pendent remained widespread among early modern philosophers, including 
Descartes.25 Consider for example article 57 of the first part of the Principles of 
Philosophy:
[I]n order to measure the duration of all things, we compare their duration with the duration 
of the greatest and most regular motions which give rise to years and days, and we call this 
duration ‘time’. Yet nothing is thereby added to duration, taken in its general sense, except 
for a mode of thought. (AT VIIIA 27/CSM I 212)
Leibniz can then be seen as exploring the way in which getting rid of powers 
makes the Cartesian conception of motion unstable. On the one hand, motion is 
supposed to be prior to time; time is supposed to be the measure of motion. On 
the other hand, as mere translation motion will be time-dependent through and 
through.26 It is worth noticing that while vulnerable to Leibniz’s criticism read in 
Aristotelians terms, it is much less clear that Descartes would have been moved 
by a Zenonian line of objection, as he too endorses a broadly Aristotelian view of 
continuous quantities (see AT IV 445–7).
Reading the argument from successiveness in the context of the dialectic 
between Aristotelians and Descartes further helps to explain why Leibniz thinks 
that what is real in motion must consist in force, a point the Zenonian reading 
leaves somewhat obscure, as noted earlier. Recall that Leibniz’s Cartesian oppo-
nent can be seen as reasoning along something like the following lines: if there 
are no powers sustaining motion, then all there is to motion is translation; mech-
anism shows that there is no explanatory need for powers sustaining motion; 
and so, all there is to motion is translation. I suggest that we read Leibniz as 
arguing from the same starting-point but in the other direction. In other words, 
25 See also Spinoza’s claim in Metaphysical Thoughts I.4 that time “is not an affection of things, 
but only a mere mode of thinking, or, as we have already said, a being of reason.” (Spinoza 1988, 
310). Cf. Ethics II, proposition 45, scholium (Spinoza 1988, 482).
26 Appealing to duration as distinct from time does not really help here, since duration itself 
seems to be a matter of motion for Descartes, as he says in the passage just quoted.
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my proposal is that Leibniz begins from an assumption shared by his Cartesian 
opponent, but where the Cartesian affirms the antecedent, Leibniz denies the 
consequent: if there are no powers sustaining motion, then all there is to motion 
is translation; it cannot be the case that all there is to motion is translation (for 
as such motion would entirely lack reality); and so, there are powers sustaining 
motion. Even if we grant that the role Aristotelians attribute to powers in explain-
ing why change takes place is rendered void by the mechanistic conception of 
uniform motion as basic, this does not undermine the constitutive role of powers 
with respect to motion.
What then about Leibniz’s claim in the “Specimen” that what is real in 
motion is “a momentary something which must consist in a force striving toward 
change”? As we have seen, this passage seems at first sight to support the sort of 
conception of force proposed by the Zenonian reading – force as instantaneous 
tendency. However, a closer look at other texts where Leibniz elaborates the argu-
ment from successiveness suggests that this is in fact not at all what he has in 
mind. Consider the following passage from a 1703 letter to Jaquelot:
[M]otion is not a being, any more than is time, since it has no coexisting parts, and so can 
never exist. But force subsists and can endure. […] Since force is present at an instant [se 
trouvant dans l’instant] it is by means of it that a moving body at an instant differs from a 
body which is at rest […] (GP III 457/WF 200, emphases added)
Here Leibniz seems to say that force is both present at an instant and something 
that subsists. This may strike us as puzzling, at least to the extent that we asso-
ciate ‘momentary’ or ‘instantaneous’ (and their cognates) with existing at, and 
only, at a moment. Yet Leibniz seems to mean something different by these locu-
tions, as comes out in a letter to Pellisson, written twelve years earlier:
Motion is a successive being, which consequently never exists, no more than time, since 
all of its parts never exist together: instead of this, I hold that force or effort exists wholly at 
each moment [existe tout entier à chaque moment] and has to be something true and real. (A 
II.ii 434, emphasis added)
This suggests that, in the context of the argument from successiveness, Leibniz 
uses ‘momentary’ in the sense of existing wholly at each moment. That is, ‘momen-
tary’ here does not mean existing at, and only at, a moment, but being constantly 
present: to divide up a body’s trajectory is not to divide up the underlying force, 
since the latter fully exists at any moment throughout the trajectory.
Contrary to what might seem to be the case, Leibniz’s characterization of 
force as “momentary” is in fact very much in line with the Aristotelian notion 
of power as permanent in the sense of enduring. Indeed, in a later letter to 
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Hermann, Leibniz connects the momentary character of power with its not 
involving time: “power for me is extended through time [per tempus extenditur], 
since, in my sense, in and of itself it does not involve time, but is something 
momentary [momentaneum]” (GM IV 389). “Extending through time” does not 
mean that force is temporally extended in the way successive entities are, but 
that force is something that is fully present throughout change. This suggests 
that the reason power does not involve time is that it is not part of the essence 
of power to have a certain duration or to exist at some particular time.27 In other 
words, the point Leibniz makes in terms of ‘momentary’ is precisely the Aris-
totelian point about the permanence of powers. Elsewhere Leibniz also uses 
the contrast between permanence and successiveness to characterize power or 
force: “action and power are different things, the former successive, the latter 
permanent,” as he puts it in his 1698 essay “On Nature Itself” (GP IV 509/AG 160; 
cf. C 481; GP IV 396/AG 253).
The idea of force as a “momentary something” in the sense of permanent, of 
existing wholly at each moment, is of course exactly what is to be expected on an 
Aristotelian reading of the argument from successiveness. The upshot is then that 
this reading not only manages to better capture the structure and modal strength 
of the argument, but also fits better with the notion of force that Leibniz employs. 
It is true that in the letter to Jaquelot quoted above Leibniz emphasizes the sig nifi-
cance of force in distinguishing between motion and rest. Yet this need not indi-
cate that Zenonian considerations play any important role in the argument – after 
all, such considerations would be incompatible with the permanence of force also 
stressed in the same passage. The claim about the role of force in distinguishing 
between motion and rest is, I believe, best read as a further point, rather than one 
of the central premises of the argument.28
27 Rutherford 2008, 276  – to which I owe the reference to, as well as the translation of, the 
Hermann passage – seems to read it in line with the Zenonian interpretation, taking “does not 
inolve time” simply to mean that force does not exist for a time, but only at a time. He is perhaps 
encouraged by the fact that Leibniz goes on to talk of force as being “replicated at any moment” 
(GM IV 389). However, the general thrust of the passage suggests to me that we should not take 
talk of “replication” too literally.
28 An additional question, which I will not be able to address here, is how to understand other 
places where Leibniz seems to appeal to apparently Zenonian considerations, such as his famous 
argument in “On Nature Itself” concerning the individuation of bodies in the plenum (GP IV 
512–4/AG 163  f.).
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5  Force vs. Potency
In this final section, I will turn to the more general significance of the reading of 
Leibniz’s argument from successiveness defended here. I will indicate how the 
reading can actually shed new light on some of his most important claims about 
the nature of force: the contrast he seeks to draw between his own conception of 
power as force and the Aristotelian conception of power as potency, as well as 
his idea that, in some sense, forces need to be located beyond the mechanistic 
corporeal realm.
While seeking to restore the Aristotelian view of power as a permanent ground 
of motion, Leibniz is also critical of the way in which Aristotelians understand the 
nature of powers. In the “Specimen” he talks disparagingly of scholastic powers 
as “simple facult[ies]” (GM VI 235/AG 118) and elsewhere as “bare potencies” (NE 
140). I believe these comments reflect a difficulty about upholding even the con-
stitutive role of powers within the framework of the new science. Here we need 
to keep in mind that on the Aristotelian conception of kinesis as “the actuality of 
what is in potency, as such” (201a9) a process of change is directed towards an 
end-state, the full actuality of the potency. In the case of the growth of a plant the 
end-state is its full size; in that of the downward motion of a rock it is resting on 
the ground, near the center of the earth. It is hard, however, to see how the actu-
alization of a potency could be what underlies uniform motion, since the latter is 
by nature open-ended, not directed to an end-state. To the extent that there are 
powers sustaining uniform motion, it seems as if the nature of power needs to be 
reconceived.
Such an approach to Leibniz’s critical remarks about Aristotelian powers 
tallies well with the way in which he elaborates the contrast between force and 
potency. Of particular significance is his stress on the notion of activity as a key 
to understanding force: for example, in the “New System” he characterizes force 
as “contain[ing] not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original 
activity” (GP IV 479/AG 139, Leibniz’s emphasis; cf. GP III 657).29 ‘Activity’ (activi-
tas or activité) is Leibniz’s rendering of the Aristotelian energeia (e.  g., GP III 368; 
29 In this context, Leibniz discusses primitive force – that is, force as constituting the nature of 
substance – but I take it that his characterization applies to force in general. Indeed, as we will 
see at the end of this section, one upshot of my reading of the argument from successiveness is 
that it encourages us to rethink the significance of the distinction between derivative and prim-
itive forces. It is, of course, a further question what it means for force to constitute the nature of 
substance. I take up this issue in “Leibniz on Power and the Nature of Substance” (manuscript), 
where I deal more generally with Leibniz’s critique of the Aristotelian notions of power and sub-
stance.
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GP IV 504/AG 156; GP IV 588/WF 163). While it may initially seem confusing to 
make use of the Aristotelian apparatus in criticizing the Aristotelian position, 
appealing to energeia in the course of trying to work out the ground for the new 
mechanistic conception of change is actually not so far-fetched. In Metaphys-
ics IX.6 Aristotle himself introduces energeia by way of contrast to kinesis – a con-
trast between processes that lack and those that have an internal limit, respec-
tively.30 As directed towards some non-actual end-state, a kinesis has a limit, and 
as such it can be more or less incomplete: for example, more or fewer of the stages 
of the growth of a plant can be in place. Correspondingly, the underlying potency 
can be more or less incomplete in the sense that it can be more or less actualized. 
An energeia, on the other hand, lacks a limit: it is not directed at some further 
end-state, but is undertaken for “its own sake” – it is an end in itself.
Aristotle takes living as a paradigmatic example of energeia (others include 
perceiving and understanding). When a plant dies before reaching its full size, its 
process of growth is left incomplete: the stages that would complete the process 
never came into existence; the plant’s potency remains partly unactualized. With 
respect to the plant’s life or living there is, however, no such end-state that the 
plant failed to achieve: death is not the full actuality of life, but an interruption of 
it. At any moment of its life the plant was “fully” living.
This is a somewhat difficult point. One way to understand it, which at least 
helps to appreciate what Leibniz found attractive about the notion of energeia, 
is to take Aristotle to distinguish between: (i) life as a successive process; and 
(ii) living, energeia, as the permanent or enduring basis of life. Energeia is thus 
not quite on a par with kinesis, but instead occupies a place similar to that of a 
potency: the energeia of living stands to the successive process of life as a potency 
stands to kinesis, i.  e., as something that underlies or is the basis of it. There is, 
however, an important difference here, paralleling the difference between the 
open-ended sort of succession that an energeia grounds and the end-state-di-
rected sort (kinesis) that a potency grounds. Unlike a potency, an energeia cannot 
be more or less actualized, but is, as it were, a permanent “doing” – throughout 
life there is constant living.
Thereby we can also understand why Leibniz would have found the notion 
of activity attractive in developing an alternative conception of power suited to 
the mechanistic view of motion. Constant activity seems to be a better candidate 
30 Here I draw on Waterlow 1982, 183–91. Doing justice to the complexities of Aristotle’s views 
would of course require a more nuanced treatment than the one offered here. For example, 
Charles 2015 argues that kinesis is in some respect more energeia-like than my schematic pre sen-
tation of the contrast allows for.
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than potency for the purpose of accounting for the sort of power that underlies 
the open-ended process of a body moving uniformly, changing position at a con-
stant rate. When Leibniz in the letter to Pellisson quoted in section four above 
says that “force or effort exists wholly at each moment” (A II.ii 434), the emphasis 
on wholly may then not only express the traditional Aristotelian idea that what is 
real in motion is a permanent power, but also an alternative way of conceiving of 
such a power – not as a potency, but as force: as an activity fully actual at each 
moment.31
Of course, important further questions remain about how to spell out the 
details of the constitutive role of power on Leibniz’s new conception of power as 
force. Here I would, however, simply want to draw attention to the way his talk of 
a “force striving toward change” (GM VI 235/AG 118) is placed in a new light. The 
emphasis on striving is naturally read in dispositional terms: the nature of force is 
given by its being directed to some non-actual state. Indeed, this is central to the 
Zenonian reading’s construal of force as an instantaneous tendency to change 
position. Yet an activity is supposed to be something fully actual in the sense of 
not being directed to some further end-state. Hence, if force is to be understood 
in terms of activity, it seems as if dispositionality cannot belong to the essence of 
force.
In fact, a more careful look reveals that Leibniz does not want to identify force 
and striving, or explain force in terms of striving. In the “Specimen” he states 
that striving depends on force: “only force and the nisus arising [nascens] from 
it exist at any moment (for motion never really exists, as we discussed above)” 
(GM VI 252/AG 135, emphasis added). The idea seems to be that it is in virtue of its 
force that a body will have a nisus (tendency) to change position. It is not clear, 
however, what the status of these tendencies is supposed to be. Even if there is a 
sense in which a body moving with uniform velocity can be described as at any 
moment “tending” to move to the next position along the tangent, it is not clear 
that this amounts to positing tendencies over and above the presence of constant 
force.32
31 Note that from an Aristotelian perspective, there is no opposition between potency and ac-
tivi ty, but activity is rather an exercise of a distinct kind of potency. To fully understand Leibniz’s 
reason for seeing activity as an alternative to the account of power as potency, we would need to 
consider his view that force constitutes the nature of substance (see footnote 29 above).
32 See Leibniz’s cautionary comment in the “Specimen” concerning the notion of solicitation to 
motion: “I wouldn’t want to claim on these grounds that these mathematical entities are really 
found in nature, but I only wish to advance them for making careful calculations through men-
tal abstraction.” (GM VI 238/AG 121) I take this to apply also to what Leibniz calls dead force, 
so-called “since motion does not yet exist in it, but only a solicitation to motion” (GM VI 238/AG 
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But how far can the connection between forces underlying motion and the 
traditional notion of energeia really be taken? While it seems to some extent plau-
sible to think of staying alive as an end in itself, as something for the sake of 
which a plant or an animal does various things (e.  g., taking in nutrition), can 
proceeding with uniform motion – having uniform velocity or speed – really be 
understood in the same way? Here some caution is needed. It is crucial to Leibniz 
that speed is external to the nature of force. He elaborates on the point in an 
important, but somewhat technical, letter to De Volder from September 1699, 
where he draws a distinction between modal and real effects, which seems to 
correspond to the distinction between phenomenon and real being, respectively 
(e.  g., A II.iii 601/LDV 131). In the case of uniform motion (what he also calls free 
action) the modal effect is change of place, whereas the real effect consists in the 
conservation of force, in the fact that “the previous force is conserved” (A II.iii 
596/LDV 123). Leibniz employs this distinction to contrast force to speed:
[S]ince the power exercising itself through a free action would in vain be measured by its 
real effect (given that it is identical with the cause, i.  e., the same in every respect), in such 
a case the modal effect and its quickness [promtitudinem] is useful and is in fact the only 
recourse. (A II.iii 596/LDV 123)
In other words, the rate of change of position should not be seen as giving the 
nature of the real effect, but is rather just a measure of it – from the presence of 
a given force, manifestation as a certain speed follows, since in this case there is 
no hindrance.
I will set aside the details of the rather intricate argument on which Leibniz 
bases these claims, an argument that draws on his famous criticism of Descartes’s 
conservation principle.33 For our purposes, it is enough to observe that the need 
to distinguish force from speed can be motivated by the role of force as providing 
the real ground of motion. Central to the latter idea is, as seen, the notion of force 
as permanent, and thus prior to time, a point on which Leibniz also insists in the 
letter to De Volder: “no account is taken of time in a real effect” (A II.iii 597/LDV 
123).34 Even though existing at, or for, some particular time does not belong to the 
essence of speed, the latter nevertheless seems to involve an essentially temporal 
121). Hence, we should not assume, as Rutherford 2008, 278  f., does, that the notion of force at 
work in the argument from successiveness is to be identified with that of dead force.
33 On this argument and some of its complications, see Lodge’s discussion in LDV, xl–xlii.
34 In general, the importance of the priority of real being over time to Leibniz’s criticism of 
Descartes’s conservation law seems underappreciated by commentators and merits further dis-
cussion (see, however, Costabel 1973, 63  f.).
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effect, namely change of position at a certain temporal rate. This would explain 
why speed, as time-dependent, cannot capture the reality of force.
Close attention to Leibniz’s argument from successiveness thus brings out 
the complexity of his notion of corporeal force. The activity-based conception of 
power can be explicated by the need for powers suited to ground the novel mech-
anistic conception of motion as open-ended. This is not to say, however, that the 
nature of force can be accounted for within the framework of a mechanistic con-
ception of the corporeal world, since, as we just saw, the relevant mechanistic 
notions are time-dependent and thus would undermine the reality of force.35
In this way, we can begin to see how the argument from successiveness is 
directly related to Leibniz’s thesis that making room for force takes us to a metaphys-
ical realm beyond the corporeal world of mechanistic science. Here another aspect 
of the Aristotelian notion of activity may have been important to him. For Aristotle 
activity is, as noted, connected to life, and as such seems to offer resources for 
articulating a positive alternative to the categories of mechanistic science. Taking 
Leibniz to be drawing on this aspect of the notion of activity offers a new way of 
looking at his claim in the “New System” that from force “there follows something 
analogous to sensation and appetite” and that we must conceive of the nature of 
substance “on the model of the notion we have of souls” (GP IV 479/AG 139). Given 
that the soul was traditionally understood as the principle of life, Leibniz’s empha-
sis on perception, appetite, and soul-likeness may be intended to evoke an Aris-
totelian notion of life-activity, rather than, as commonly held, a conception of the 
ultimate level of reality as populated by something like Cartesian minds.
Thereby we are also in a position to revisit the common way of framing the 
question of the relationship between primitive and derivative forces. Recall that 
derivative forces are usually thought of as instantaneous tendencies to change 
position; to reach something permanent we need to take a further step to another 
type of force, primitive force, the force constituting the nature of substance. My 
examination of the argument from successiveness offers a distinctively differ-
ent picture. While the relevant force seems to be derivative force, it is also to be 
understood as permanent. I believe this should not be taken as a sign of some 
sort of confusion on Leibniz’s part, but rather as an invitation to reconsider the 
idea that the distinction between derivative and primitive forces is a distinction 
35 Attending to the permanence of force brings out another reason for thinking that mechanis-
tic notions are insufficient. Even though the basic form of motion is supposed to be uniform, 
there is, as a matter of fact, little room for uniform motion within Leibniz’s plenum physics (see 
Levey 2010). To the extent that there are forces present throughout the motions of bodies within 
a plenum mechanistic universe, it seems as if they need to be such that they sustain complex, 
non-uniform, motions.
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between fundamentally different types of force. In fact, Leibniz’s own way of 
explicating the distinction suggests that he sees the relation between derivative 
and primitive forces as much closer: he insists that derivative force is just a “limi-
tation,” or “determination,” of primitive force (see, e.  g., LDV 307, 287). Now, if 
derivative force is just a way in which primitive force is limited it seems as if a 
concern with derivative force is ipso facto a concern with primitive force. And in 
that case, there does not appear to be anything problematic about the idea that 
the argument from successiveness, as having to do with derivative forces, would 
be an argument for permanent force.
Note further that there is a more general reason to question the need for inter-
preting the relationship between, on the one hand, derivative or corporeal force, 
and, on the other hand, primitive force, in terms of a distinction between two 
types of force. As we have seen, such a need results from the conception of cor-
poreal forces as tendencies to change position and thus as essentially different in 
kind from primitive forces. Yet this may not be the right way to think of corporeal 
force, at least if my interpretation of the argument from successiveness is on the 
right track. For on my interpretation, the notion of corporeal force is to be under-
stood as activity rather than as tendency to change position. This opens up, as 
we have also seen, a route from within the notion of corporeal force to the thesis 
that force ultimately lies beyond the mechanistic realm. That is, the notion of 
corporeal force is itself a more “metaphysical” notion than what has often been 
thought. While these suggestions stand in need of further elaboration, one impor-
tant implication is that some supposedly deep worries about how to fit together 
the corporeal and the metaphysical in Leibniz – worries arising precisely from the 
usual way of construing derivative force as a distinct type of force from primitive 
force – may not be so deep after all.
Concluding Remarks
My main aim here has been to present an alternative reading of the argument from 
successiveness, according to which it is to be understood as a version of an Aristo-
telian worry about the time-dependence of successive entities, and as appealing 
to a corresponding notion of force as permanent. I have also tried to bring out 
the broader significance of this interpretation by showing how it bears on some 
of the fundamental issues concerning Leibniz’s conception of force. First, I have 
argued that the question of what the nature of permanent powers looks like on a 
mechanistic picture provides a good starting-point for appreciating the contrast 
Leibniz wants to draw between, on the one hand, the Aristotelian conception of 
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power as potency, and, on the other hand, his own conception of power as force. 
Secondly, and finally, I have broached the way in which the activity conception 
of corporeal force can offer a new understanding of Leibniz’s route to the thesis 
that force ultimately lies beyond the purview of the mechanistic world-picture.36
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